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19 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Bill Moyers

1. Mr. Moyers told us today that the President had recently given him a mandate to see everything originating with the Agency which goes to the President. Mr. Moyers said that he would convey this new mandate to Mr. McGeorge Bundy when he returns from the Dominican Republic.
2. Would you please start immediately sending a separate copy of the President's Daily Brief and the Central Intelligence Bulletin to Mr. Moyers at the White House. Also, he should be put on the list of addressees for our SNIE's and other estimative papers.
3. Since I do not know what other publications and issuances Mr. Bundy sends to the President, you will want to get in circuit with him in an effort to be sure that Mr. Moyers is getting what he needs.
4. We still have quite a problem at the White House getting material to the President. Mr. Bromley Smith spoke to me about it again today. Upon Mr. Bundy's return, we have all got to get together and see if we can solve this crucial problem.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director

cc: DCI

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68-7-355 Box 1 of 3  
20 May 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Reporting to the White House

REFERENCE : Your Memo for the Record, 14 May 1963

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CSDD in W.O.

1. We have striven mightily over the years to conform to your points 1 and 2. The one exception which now exists to our knowledge is our delivery of finished output to Moyers at EDCI's instruction. Cable Secretariat is also delivering [redacted] to Moyers, but is having a difficult time finding anyone in the White House willing to sign for them. (Our stuff at least goes to Moyers through the Situation Room, because of its classification, but what happens to it after that we have no idea.) Should any of this continue and, if so, how?

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2. A "greased channel" now exists, as far as we can tell, for the President's Brief and for our Dominican spot reports. It would be possible to extend the spot report system to cover the whole range of intelligence reporting. In this case, the President's Brief group would be responsible for selecting and writing spot reports, except when a task force is functioning. These would be worldwide, but would be based only on intelligence sources, i.e., no State or operational military traffic. This system would also be responsive to any instructions from the DCI. If Bundy wishes this, we can start it with no great strain.

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3. The [redacted] problem is something else again. At present, about 30 such reports a day are sent to the White House (the "EKO" dissemination). Primary selection is done by Cable Secretariat, which sends to EKO [redacted] which are sent to the DCI. A secondary selection is carried out by the DD/P division reports officers, who may recommend to FI Staff that a report be sent to EKO if they happen to be aware of a White House interest. The selected cables go to the White House by courier around the clock, and many go electrically. It is literally impossible to insert any DD/I evaluation into this process without slowing it down.

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4. We also do not believe it is feasible to eliminate the delivery of raw traffic to the White House. The White House already receives a much larger proportion of State's and DOD's raw traffic than it does of CIA's. Moreover, CIA's traffic is disseminated to everyone else. The trend of the times is for more raw disseminations, not less, and for passage direct from the field to the White House without intervening delays in Washington.

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Our spot reports are an attempt to cope with this.

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5. We can see two ways to meet your requirements in this situation. The first is an extension of the spot report system we propose in Para 2. It would involve an agreement with Bundy and Bron Smith that they would consult with OGI if they believe the President should see a CS report. OGI would then either prepare an evaluated spot report or include the material in the President's Brief, depending on time factors. The selection and flow of raw reports would not be changed.

6. The second solution involves much more basic changes, but would have some desirable side effects. This would be to transfer from Cable Secretariat to Operations Center the basic responsibility for selecting intelligence cables for the DCI and for the President. The SDO could then decide whether to pass the report as is, or with comment, or as a spot report. At the same time, the full take of raw DD/P output could be delivered to Debevoise's shop for the White House Staff without smothering the Bundy-Smith complex and without denying "The White House" any CIA raw intelligence. The advantage in this system comes from our long-standing belief that the Operations Center can do a better job of selection for the DCI than can the Cable Secretariat, and that it is better to have this job done in one place than in two, as at present. Cable Secretariat now selects from CIA and State Cable traffic; Operations Center selects from everything else. We see the White House responsibility as a handle to get the DCI responsibility transferred. Under present White House conditions, keeping the DCI informed is probably the best service we can perform. Also, acceptance of this change would virtually force DD/P to create a senior duty officer of his own and put him in the Operations Center.

CSDO  
in Ops  
Center

R. J. SMITH

Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

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1 - AD White House file -2-

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